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ABSTRACT
Secret-key agreement protocols over wiretap channels con-
trolled by a state parameter are studied. The entire state se-
quence is known (non-causally) to the sender but not to the
receiver and the eavesdropper. Upper and lower bounds on
the secret-key capacity are established both with and with-
out public discussion. The proposed coding scheme involves
constructing a codebook to create common reconstruction of
the state sequence at the sender and the receiver and another
secret-key codebook constructed by random binning. For the
special case of Gaussian channels, with no public discussion,
— the secret-key generation with dirty paper problem, the
gap between our bounds is at-most 1/2 bit and the bounds co-
incide in the high signal-to-noise ratio and high interference-
to-noise ratio regimes. In the presence of public discussion
our bounds coincide, yielding the capacity, when then the
channels of the receiver and the eavesdropper satisfy an in-
dependent noise condition.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many applications in cryptography require that the legitimate
terminals have shared secret keys, not available to unautho-
rized parties. Information theoretic security encompasses the
study of source and channel coding techniques to generate
secret-keys between legitimate terminals. In the channel cod-
ing literature, an early work in this area is the wiretap chan-
nel model [1]. It consists of three terminals one sender, one
receiver and one eavesdropper. The sender communicates to
the receiver and the eavesdropper over a discrete-memoryless
broadcast channel. A notion of equivocation-rate the nor-
malized conditional entropy of the transmitted message given
the observation at the eavesdropper, is introduced, and the
tradeoff between information rate and equivocation rate is
studied. Perfect secrecy capacity, defined as the maximum
information rate under the constraint that the equivocation
rate approaches the information rate asymptotically in the
block length is of particular interest. Information transmit-
ted at this rate can be naturally used as a shared secret-key
between the sender and the receiver. In the source coding
setup [2, 3] the two terminals observe correlated source se-
quences and use a public discussion channel for communica-
tion. Any information sent over this channel is available to an
eavesdropper. The terminals generate a common secret-key
that is concealed from the eavesdropper in the same sense as
the wiretap channel the equivocation
In the present paper we consider a secret-key agreement
problem when the sender and the receiver communicate over
a channel controlled by a state parameter. The state parame-
ter is known to the sender but not to the receiver or the eaves-
dropper. The problem of transmitting information on such
channels, without secrecy constraints, is studied in [4]. A
random binning strategy is proposed and shown to achieve
the capacity. Costa [5] studies the problem of communicat-
ing over an additive noise Gaussian channel with an addi-
tive interference sequence known to the transmitter and es-
tablishes that there is no loss in capacity if the interference
sequence is known only to the transmitter. In the present
work, we study the problem of generating a common secret
key between the sender and the receiver over such channels.
Our proposed coding scheme is not based on the Gel’fand-
Pinsker binning technique for sending an information mes-
sage over such channels. Instead our codebook is designed to
create a common reconstruction sequence at the sender and
the receiver and distilling a secret-key based on this common
sequence.
In related works, the problem of secret-message trans-
mission over wiretap channels controlled by a state parame-
ter is studied in [6, 7]. In these works an achievable coding
scheme is proposed that combines Gel’fand Pinsker coding
and coding for the wiretap channel. As discussed earlier,
our coding scheme is based on a different approach and in
general yields higher achievable rates. A related problem of
common reconstruction of state sequences has been studied
recently in [8, 9]. The problem of secret-key agreement with
symmetric channel state information at the sender and the
legitimate receiver has been studied in [10]. However the
coding scheme involved is based on the fact that the termi-
nals have knowledge of the common state sequence to be-
gin with. After this paper was submitted, we learnt about a
recent work [11] where the problem of communicating over
over channels with non-causal CSI is used as a building block
for characterizing the tradeoff between secret-key and secret-
message transmission.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
As Fig. 1 illustrates, the channel model has three terminals
— a sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. The sender
communicates with the other two terminals over a discrete-
memoryless-channel with transition probability pyr,ye|x,s(·)
where x denotes the channel input symbol, whereas yr and
ye denote the channel output symbols at the receiver and the
eavesdropper respectively. The symbol s denotes a state vari-
able that controls the channel transition probability. We as-
sume that it is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution ps in each
channel use. Further, the entire sequence sn is known to the
sender before the communication begins.
In defining the secret-key capacity we separately con-
sider the cases when a public discussion channel is and is
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel controlled by a state parameter. The channel transition probability pyr ,ye|x,s() is controlled by a state
parameter s. The entire source sequence sn is known to the sender but not to the receiver or the eavesdropper. The sender and
receiver generate a secret key κ at the end of the transmission.
not present.
2.1 No Public Discussion
A length n encoder is defined as follows. The sender sam-
ples a random variables u from the conditional distribution
pu|sn(·|snr ). The encoding function produces a channel input
sequence xn = fn(u,sn) and transmits it over n uses of the
channel. At time i the symbol xi is transmitted and the legit-
imate receiver and the eavesdropper observe output symbols
yri and yei respectively, sampled from the conditional distri-
bution pyr,ye|x,s(·). The sender and receiver compute secret
keys κ = gn(u,sn) and l = hn(ynr ). A rate R is achievable
if there exists a sequence of encoding functions such that
for some sequence εn that vanishes as n → ∞, we have that
Pr(κ 6= l)≤ εn and 1n H(κ)≥ R− εn and
1
n
I(κ ;yne )≤ εn. (1)
The largest achievable rate is the secret-key capacity.
2.2 Presence of Public Discussion
When a public discussion channel is present, the described
protocol follows closely the interactive communication pro-
tocol in [3]. The sender transmits symbols x1, . . . ,xn at times
0 < i1 < i2 < .. . < in over the wiretap channel. At these
times the receiver and the eavesdropper observe symbols
yr1, . . . ,yrn and ye1, . . . ,yen respectively. In the remaining
times the sender and receiver exchange messages ψt and φt
where 1 ≤ t ≤ k. For convenience we let in+1 = k+ 1. The
eavesdropper observes both ψt and φt .
More specifically the sender and receiver sample random
variables u and v from conditional distributions pu|sn(·|snr )
and pv (·) and observe that v is independent of (u,sn).
• At times 0 < t < i1, the sender generates
φt = Φt(u,sn,ψt−1) and the receiver generates
ψt = Ψt(v ,φ t−1). These messages are exchanged
over the public channel.
• At times i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender generates x j =
X j(u,sn,ψ i j−1) and sends it over the channel. The re-
ceiver and eavesdropper observe yr, j ad ye, j respectively.
For these times we set ψi j = φi j = 0.
• For times i j < t < i j+1, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender
and receiver compute φt = Φt (u,sn,ψt−1) and ψt =
Ψt(v ,y jr ,φ t−1) respectively and exchange them over the
public channel.
• At time k + 1, the sender and receiver compute κ =
gn(u,sn,ψk) and the receiver computes l = hn(v ,ynr ,φ k).
We require that for some sequence εn that vanishes as
n→ ∞, Pr(κ 6= l)≤ εn and
1
n
I(κ ;yne ,ψk,φ k)≤ εn. (2)
The secret-key rate is defined as 1
n
H(κ) and the largest
achievable secret-key rate is the capacity.
3. MAIN RESULTS
Our main results are upper and lower bounds on the secret-
key capacity, which coincide in some special cases. We again
consider the cases of no public discussion and public discus-
sion separately.
3.1 No Public Discussion
We first provide an achievable rate (lower bound) on the
secret-key capacity.
Theorem 1 An achievable secret-key rate without public
discussion is
R− = max
pu ,px |s,u
I(u;yr)− I(u;ye), (3)
where the maximization is over all auxiliary random vari-
ables u that satisfy the Markov condition u → (x ,s) →
(yr,ye) and furthermore satisfy the constraint that
I(u;yr)− I(u;s)≥ 0. (4)
The intuition behind the coding scheme is as follows.
Upon observing sn, the sender communicates the best pos-
sible reproduction un of the state sequence to the receiver.
Now both the sender and the receiver observe a common se-
quence un. The set of all codewords un is binned into 2nR−
bins and the bin-index is declared to be the secret key.
We note that the lower bound can be easily extended to
the case of two-sided CSI. If the receiver observes another
state sequence sr, correlated with s according to a joint distri-
bution ps,sr(·, ·) then the achievable rate expression (3) holds
provided that we augment the received symbol by (yr,sr).
Finally for the case of symmetric CSI i.e., when sr = s,
the constraint (4) is redundant as clearly I(u;yr,s)− I(u;s)≥
0 holds. Furthermore the resulting achievable rate,
R− = max
pu ,px |s,u
I(u;yr,s)− I(u;ye)
is indeed the secret-key capacity as established in our earlier
work [10].
Finally we note that the problem of secret-key agreement
is different from the secret-message transmission problem
considered in [6, 12, 7]. This is because the secret-key can
be an arbitrary function of the state sequence (known only to
the transmitter) whereas the secret-message needs to be inde-
pendent function of the state sequence. For comparison, the
best known lower bound on the secret-message transmission
problem is stated below.
Proposition 1 [6, 12, 7] An achievable secret message rate
for wiretap channel with non-causal transmiter CSI is
R≤ max
pu ,px |u,s
I(u;yr)−max(I(u;s), I(u;ye)) . (5)
We note that whenever the maximizing u satisfies,
I(u;ye)> I(u;s) > I(u;ye), the secret-key rate (3) is strictly
better than the secret-message rate (5).
The following theorem develops an upper bound on
secret-key capacity that is amenable to numerical computa-
tion.
Theorem 2 The secret-key capacity in absence of public dis-
cussion is upper bounded by C ≤ R+, where
R+ = min
pyr ,ye|x∈P
max
px |s
I(x ,s;yr|ye), (6)
where P denotes all the joint distributions p⋆
yr,ye|x,s that have
the same marginal distribution as the original channel.
The intuition behind the upper bound is as follows. We
create a degraded channel by revealing the output of the
eavesdropper to the legitimate receiver. We further assume
a channel with two inputs (xn,sn) i.e., the state sequence sn
is not arbitrary, but rather a part of the input codeword with
distribution psr . The secrecy capacity of the resulting wiretap
channel is then given by I(x ,s;yr|ye).
Our proposed upper and lower bounds coincide, yielding
capacity in some special cases. We present one such case in
section 3.3.
3.2 With Public Discussion
In this section we provide lower and upper bounds on the
secret-key capacity with public discussion. We first provide
a lower bound below.
Theorem 3 An achievable secret-key rate with public dis-
cussion is:
R−disc = max
(
max
px |s
I(x ,s;yr)− I(ye;yr),R−
)
(7)
where R− is the lower bound attained without public discus-
sion in Theorem 1
The achievability scheme involves a natural modification
of Maurer’s coding scheme [3, 2] to incorporate the pres-
ence of the state parameter and involves a single round of
discussion. In particular, the sender generate a sequence xn
according to the conditional distribution px|s(x|s) and trans-
mits over n channel uses. At the end of the transmission,
the receiver sends the bin index of ynr , so that the sender can
recover this sequence given (xn,snr ).
Next we provide an upper bound on the secret-key capac-
ity under public discussion.
Theorem 4 An upper bound on the secret-key capacity is
R+ = max
px |s
I(x ,s;yr|ye). (8)
We note that the upper bound expression (8) is similar to the
upper bound expression in (6) except that we cannot min-
imize over the joint-probability distribution in (8). This is
because the public discussion channel provides a mechanism
for feedback and hence the capacity does depend on the joint
distribution (not just the marginal distributions). The proof
for the upper bound expression in Theorem 4 also signifi-
cantly more elaborate as it accounts for public discussion.
We note that if the channel additionally satisfies yr →
(x ,s)→ ye then the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 3
and 2 coincide. In particular if px|s is the maximizing distri-
bution in (8), we have that
R−disc ≥ I(x ,s;yr)− I(ye;yr)
= I(ye,x ,s;yr)− I(ye;yr)− I(yr;ye|x ,s)
= I(ye,x ,s;yr)− I(ye;yr)
= I(x ,s;yr|ye) = R+disc.
Since R−disc ≤ R+disc, it follows that the two expressions must
be equal. This is summarized in the result below.
Theorem 5 The secret-key capacity with public discussion
for a DMC channel that satisfies yr → (x ,s)→ ye is given by
Cdisc = maxpx |s
I(x ,s;yr|ye). (9)
3.3 Gaussian Case
We now study the Gaussian special case under an average
power constraint. The channel to the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper is expressed as:
yr = x + s+ zr
ye = x + s+ ze,
(10)
where zr ∼ N (0,1) and ze ∼ N (0,1+ ∆) denote the ad-
ditive white Gaussian nose and are assumed to be sampled
independently. The state parameter s ∼N (0,Q) is also sam-
pled i.i.d. at each time instance and is independent of both zr
and ze. Furthermore, the channel input satisfies an average
power constraint E[x2] ≤ P. As the title indicates, we call
this setup, secret sharing with dirty paper.
Thus the parameter P denotes the signal-to-noise ra-
tio, the parameter Q denotes the interference-to-noise-ratio,
whereas ∆ denotes the degradation level of the eavesdropper.
We now provide lower and upper bounds on the secret-key
capacity with and without public discussion. For simplicity
in exposition we limit our analysis to the case when P≥ 1.
Proposition 2 Assuming that P ≥ 1, a lower bound on the
secret-key agreement capacity is capacity is given by,
R− =
1
2
log
(
1+ ∆(P+Q+ 2ρ
√
PQ)
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2ρ√PQ
)
, (11)
where ρ < 1 is the largest value that satisfies
P(1−ρ2)≥ 1− 1
P+Q+ 1 . (12)
Proposition 3 In absence of public discussion, an upper
bound on the secret-key capacity is given by,
R+ =
1
2
log
(
1+ ∆(P+Q+ 2
√
PQ)
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2√PQ
)
(13)
It can be readily verified that the upper and lower bounds
coincide in several asymptotic regimes.
Proposition 4 The upper and lower bounds on secret-
capacity without public discussion satisfying the following
∀P≥ 0, R+−R− ≤ 12 (14)
lim
P→∞
R+−R− = 0 (15)
lim
Q→∞
R+−R− = 0 (16)
Proposition 5 In the presence of public discussion, the
secret-key capacity is given by the following expression,
R+ =
1
2
log
(
1+ (1+∆)(P+Q+ 2
√
PQ)
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2√PQ
)
(17)
4. WITHOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In this section we provide the coding scheme and the upper
bound for the case when there is no public discussion.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
A sequence of length n code is described as follows.
4.1.1 Codebook Generation
• Generate a total of 2n(I(u;ye)−2εn) sequences. Each se-
quence is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution pu(·).
• Select a rate R = I(u;yr)− I(u;ye)− εn and randomly
partition the set sequences in the previous step into 2nR
bins so that there are 2n(I(u;yr)−εn) sequences in each bin.
4.1.2 Encoding
• Given a state sequence sn the encoder selects a sequence
un randomly from the list of all possible sequences that
are jointly typical with sn.
• At time i = 1,2, . . . ,n the encoder transmits symbol xi
generated by sampling the distribution px|u,s(·|ui,si).
4.1.3 Secret-key generation
• The decoder upon observing ynr finds a sequence unjointly typical with ynr .
• Both encoder and the decoder declare the bin-index of un
to be the secret-key.
4.1.4 Secrecy Analysis
We need to show that for the proposed encoder and decoder,
the equivocation at the eavesdropper satisfies
1
n
H(κ |yne ) = I(u;yr)− I(u;ye)+ on(1), (18)
where on(1) is a term that goes to zero as n→ ∞.
Accordingly note that
1
n
H(κ |yne ) =
1
n
H(κ ,un|yne )−
1
n
H(un|yne ,κ)
=
1
n
H(un|yne )−
1
n
H(un|yne ,κ)
=
1
n
H(un|yne )− εn
where the last step follows from the fact that there are at-most
2n(I(u;ye)−on(1)) sequences in each bin and hence the eaves-
dropper can decode the codeword un given the key κ . It re-
mains to lower-bound the first conditional entropy term.
1
n
H(un|yne ) =
1
n
H(un)+
1
n
H(yne |un)−
1
n
H(yne ) (19)
=
1
n
H(un)+
1
n
H(yne |un,sn)−
1
n
H(yne )+
1
n
I(sn;yne |un)
(20)
We now appropriately bound each term in (20). First note
that since the sequence un is uniformly distributed among
the set of all possible codeword sequences, it follows that
1
n
H(un) =
1
n
log2 |C |− εn
= I(u;yr)− εn (21)
Next, given (un,sn), as verified below, the channel to the
p1
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Figure 2: Secret-key agreement codebook for the dirty paper channel. The transmitter signal xn is selected so that un = xn+sn
is a sequence in the random codebook. The legitimate receiver can decode un (with high probability) and map it to the secret-
key. The eavesdropper’s noise-uncertainity sphere includes are possible key values. Note that unlike the traditional dirty-paper
code, the transmiter signal xn has a component along sn. The achievable rate, does depend on the interference power and hence
it is beneficial to amplify it using part of the transmit power. Also note that unlike a dirty-paper code we do not scale down sn
before quantizing but use α = 1.
eavesdropper is memoryless:
pyne |un,sn(y
n
e |un,sn)
= ∑
xn∈X n
pyne |un,sn,xn(y
n
e |un,sn,xn)p(xn|un,sn)(xn|un,sn)
= ∑
xn∈X n
n
∏
i=1
pye|u,s,x(ye,i|ui,si,xi)px|u,s(xi|ui,si)
=
n
∏
i=1
∑
xi∈X
pye|u,s,x (ye,i|ui,si,xi)px|u,s (xi|ui,si)
=
n
∏
i=1
pye|u,s(ye,i|ui,si)
The second step above follows from the fact that the channel
is memoryless and the symbol xi at time i is generated as a
function of (ui,si). Hence we have that
1
n
H(yne |sn,un) =
n
∑
i=1
H(ye,i|sn,un,y i−1e,1 ) (22)
=
n
∑
i=1
H(ye,i|si,ui) (23)
Furthermore note that
1
n
H(yne )≤
n
∑
i=1
H(yei). (24)
Finally, in order to lower bound the term I(sn;yne |un) we
let J to be a random variable which equals 1 if (sn,un) are
jointly typical. Note that Pr(J = 1) = 1− on(1).
1
n
I(sn;yne |un) =
1
n
H(sn|un)− 1
n
H(sm|un,yne )
≥ 1
n
H(sn|un,J = 1)Pr(J = 1)− 1
n
H(sn|un,yne )
≥ 1
n
H(sn|un,J = 1)− 1
n
H(sn|un,yne )− on(1)
≥ H(s|u)− 1
n
H(sn|un,yne )− on(1) (25)
≥ H(s|u)− 1
n
n
∑
i=1
H(si|ui,ye,i)− on(1) (26)
where (25) follows from the fact that sn is an i.i.d. sequence
and hence conditioned on the fact that (sn,un) is a pair of
typical sequence there are 2nH(s|u)−non(1) possible sequences
sn.
Substituting (21), (23), (24) and (26) in the lower
bound (20) and using the fact that as n→ ∞, the summation
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Figure 3: Bounds on the capacity of the “secret-sharing with dirty paper” channel with and without public discussion. In the
left figure, we plot the capacity as a function of SNR (dB) when Q = 10 and ∆ = 10. The upper-most curve is the capacity
with public-discussion whereas the other two curves denote the upper and lower bounds without discussion. In the right figure
we plot the capacity with public discussion as a function of ∆ (in dB) when P = 10 dB and Q = 10 dB as well as the upper
and lower bounds without public discussion.
converges to the mean values,
1
n
H(κ |yne )
= I(u;yr)+H(ye|u,s)−H(ye)+H(s|u)−H(s|u,ye)− on(1)
= I(u;yr)− I(ye;s|u)− I(ye;u)+ I(ye;s|u)− on(1)
= I(u;yr)− I(ye;u)− on(1)
as required.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
A sequence of length-n code satisfies:
1
n
H(κ |ynr )≤ εn (27)
1
n
H(κ |yne )≥
1
n
H(κ)− εn (28)
where (27) follows from the Fano’s Lemma since the receiver
is able to recover the secret-key κ given ynr and (28) is a
consequence of the secrecy constraint. Furthermore, note
that κ → (xn,sn)→ (ynr ,yne ) holds as the encoder generates
the secret key κ . Thus we can bound the rate R = 1
n
H(κ) as
below:
nR≤ I(κ ;ynr |yne )+ 2nεn
≤ I(κ ,sn,xn;ynr |yne )+ 2nεn
= I(sn,xn;ynr |yne )+ 2nεn
=
n
∑
i=1
I(si,xi;yr,i|ye,i)+ 2nεn
≤ nI(x ,s;yr|ye)+ 2nεn
where the last step follows from the concavity of the condi-
tional entropy term I(x ,s;yr|ye) in the input distribution px,s
(see e.g., [13]).
Finally since the secret-key capacity only depends on the
marginal distribution of the channel and not on the joint dis-
tribution we can minimize over all joint distributions with
fixed marginal distributions.
5. WITH PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In this section we provide the proofs of the coding theorem
and the converse for the case when there is a public discus-
sion channel allowed.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Our coding scheme is closely related to the coding theorem
for the channel model in [3, 2] and emulates the generation
of correlated source sequences. It consists of the following
steps:
• Fix a distribution px|s . This induces a joint distribution
px,yr,ye,s . Let R = I(yr;x ,s)− I(yr;ye)− εn
• Partition the set of all typical sequences ynr into
2n(H(yr|x,s)−on(1)) bins. Furthermore partition the collec-
tion of 2n(I(yr;x,s)) sequences in each bin into further 2nR
sequences so that there are 2n(I(yr;ye)−εn) sequences in
each sub-bin.
• Given symbol si at time i, sample a symbol xi from the
conditional distribution px|s(·) and transmit it over the
channel.
• The receiver upon observing ynr transmits the bin index of
this sequence over the channel. Using the bin index and
the knowledge of (xn,sn) the sender reproduces ynr .
• Both the sender and the receiver declare the sub-bin in-
dex of ynr as the secret-key.
Following the secrecy analysis in [3, 2] it can be shown
that this construction satisfies the secrecy constraint (2) and
furthermore attains a rate of
R = I(yr;x ,s)− I(yr;ye)+ on(1).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 4
We now establish a corresponding upper bound on the secret-
key capacity.
First, using the fact that the receiver is able to recover
the secret-key and the eavesdropper is subjected to a secrecy
constraint (2), we have that
1
n
H(κ |ynr ,v ,Φk)≤ εn (29)
1
n
I(κ ;yne ,Ψk,Φk)≤ εn (30)
(31)
Using the above relations and the fact that R = 1
n
H(κ), we
note that
nR≤H(κ)
≤ I(κ ;ynr ,v ,Φk)− I(κ ;yne ,Φk,Ψk)+ 2nεn
≤ I(κ ;ynr ,v ,yne ,Φk,Ψk)− I(κ ;yne ,Φk,Ψk)+ 2nεn
≤ I(κ ;ynr ,v |yne ,Φk,Ψk)+ 2nεn
≤ I(u,sn;ynr ,v |yne ,Φk,Ψk)+ 2nεn (32)
= I(u,sn;ynr ,v ,y
n
e ,Φk,Ψk)− I(u,sn;yne ,Φk,Ψk)+ 2nεn
= I(u,sn;v ,Φi1−1,Ψi1−1)
+ I(u,sn;ynr ,y
n
e ,Φki1+1,Ψ
k
i1+1|Φi1−1,Ψi1−1,v)
− I(u,sn;Φi1−1,Ψi1−1)
− I(u,sn;yne ,Φki1+1,Ψki1+1|Ψi1−1,Φi1−1)
= I(u,sn;v |Φi1−1,Ψi1−1)+
n
∑
j=1
Fr, j +Gr, j−
n
∑
j=1
Fe, j +Ge, j
(33)
where we have introduced
Fr, j = I(u,sn;yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1r ,y j−1e ) (34)
Gr, j = I(u,sn;ψ
i j+1−1
i j+1 ,φ
i j+1−1
i j+1 |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y jr ,y je ) (35)
Fe, j = I(u,sn;ye, j |φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,v) (36)
Ge, j = I(u,sn;φ i j+1−1i j+1 ,ψ
i j+1−1
i j+1 |φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y je ) (37)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the follow-
ing relations in (33) hold
I(u,sn;v |Φi1−1,Ψi1−1) = 0 (38)
Fr, j−Fe, j ≤ I(x j ,s j;yr, j|ye, j) (39)
Gr, j−Ge, j ≤ 0 (40)
To establish (38) note that for 0 ≤ k ≤ i1 − 1 we have that
Φk =Φk(u,sn,Ψk−1) and likewise Ψk =Ψk(v ,Φk−1). Using
which
I(u,sn;v |Φi1−1,Ψi1−1)
≤ I(uΦi1−1,sn;v ,Ψi1−1|Φi1−2,Ψi1−2)
= I(u,sn;v ,Φi1−2,Ψi1−2)
Continuing this process we have that
I(u,sn;v |Φi1−1,Ψi1−1)≤ I(u,sn;v) = 0,
where the last relation follows from the fact that v is inde-
pendent of (u,sn).
In order to establish (39), we use (34) and (36) to get,
Fr, j−Fe, j
= I(u,sn;yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r )
− I(u,sn;ye, j |φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e )
= H(yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r )
−H(yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r ,u,sn)
−H(ye, j|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e )
+H(ye, j|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,u,sn)
= H(yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r )
−H(yr, j,ye, j |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r ,u,sn,x j)
−H(ye, j|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e )
+H(ye, j|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,u,sn,x j) (41)
≤ H(yr, j,ye, j |φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e )−H(yr, j,ye, j |x j,s j)
−H(ye, j|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e )+H(ye, j|x j ,s j) (42)
≤ H(yr, j|ye, j)−H(yr, j|ye, j ,x j ,s j) = I(s j,x j;yr, j|ye, j) (43)
In the above steps (41) follows from the fact that x j =
X j(u,sn,ψ i j−1) and hence we can condition of x j i the sec-
ond and fourth terms. Furthermore since the channel is mem-
oryless
(yr, j,ye, j)→ (x j ,s j)→ (v ,u,snj+1,s j−11 ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y j−1e ,y j−1r )
holds.
It remains to establish (40). Using (35) and (37) we note
that
Gr, j−Ge, j
= I(u,sn;ψ i j+1−1i j+1 ,φ
i j+1−1
i j+1 |v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y jr ,y je )
− I(u,sn;φ i j+1−1i j+1 ,ψ
i j+1−1
i j+1 |φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y je )
= H(u,sn|v ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y jr ,y je )
−H(u,sn|v ,φ i j+1−1,ψ i j+1−1,y jr ,y je )
−H(u,sn|φ i j−1,ψ i j−1,y je )+H(u,sn|φ i j+1−1,ψ i j+1−1,y je )
= I(u,sn;v ,y jr |φ i j+1−1,ψ i j+1−1,y je )− I(u,sn;v ,y jr |y je ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1)
Since φi j+1−1 = Φi j+1−1(u,sn,ψ i j+1 − 2) and ψi j+1−1 =
Ψi j+1−1(v ,y
j
r ,φ i j+1 − 2) we have that
I(u,sn;v ,y jr |φ i j+1−1,ψ i j+1−1,y je )
≤ I(u,sn,φi j+1−1;v ,y jr ,ψi j+1−1|φ i j+1−2,ψ i j+1−2,y je )
= I(u,sn;v ,y jr |φ i j+1−2,ψ i j+1−2,y je )
and continuing this process we have that
I(u,sn;v ,y jr |φ i j+1−1,ψ i j+1−1,y je )≤ I(u,sn;v ,y jr |y je ,φ i j−1,ψ i j−1)
as required.
6. GAUSSIAN CASE
In this section we develop the corresponding results for the
Gaussian case.
6.1 Proof of Prop. 2
The lower bound expression follows from Theorem 1 by
choosing x ∼ N (0,P) to be a Gaussian random variable
independent of s and by choosing u = x+αs. In this case,
R = I(u;yr)− I(u;ye)
= h(u|ye)− h(u|yr)
Further evaluating each of the terms above with u = x+αs,
note that
h(u|ye) =
1
2
log
(
P+α2Q+ 2αρ
√
PQ− (P+αQ+(1+α)ρ
√
PQ)2
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2ρ√PQ
)
and
h(u|yr) =
1
2
log
(
P+α2Q+ 2αρ
√
PQ− (P+αQ+ρ(1+α)
√
PQ)2
P+Q+ 1+ 2√PQ
)
.
This yields that
R =
1
2
log

1+ ∆
1+ PQ(α−1)
2(1−ρ2)
P+α2Q+2ρα√PQ


+
1
2
log
(
P+Q+ 1+ 2ρ√PQ
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2ρ√PQ
)
. (44)
Note that the first term in the expression above is maximized
when α = 1. As we show below, this choice is indeed feasible
when P≥ 1. In particular the constraint (4) requires that
h(u|s)≥ h(u|yr)
⇒ 1
2
logP(1−ρ2)≥
1
2
log
(
PQ(α− 1)2(1−ρ2)+ (P+α2Q)+ 2ρα√PQ)
P+Q+ 1+ 2ρ√PQ
)
.
Substituting α = 1 above we have that
P(1−ρ2)≥ 1− 1
P+Q+ 1+ 2ρ√PQ ≥ 1−
1
P+Q+ 1
(45)
as required.
6.2 Proof of Prop. 3
We evaluate the upper bound in Theorem 2 for the choice
ze = zr + zδ , where zδ ∼N (0,∆) is independent of zr.
I(s,x ;yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(yr|ye,x ,s)
= h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze
≤ 1
2
log
(
P+Q+ 1+ 2
√
PQ− (P+Q+ 1+ 2
√
PQ)2
P+Q+ 1+∆+ 2√PQ
)
−
− 1
2
log
(
1− 1
1+∆
)
where we have used the fact that the conditional entropy
h(yr|ye) is maximized by a Gaussian distribution. The above
expression gives (13).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Since the Gaussian model satisfies the condition in Theo-
rem 5, it suffices to evaluate C = I(x ,s;yr|ye).
I(x ,s;yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(yr|ye,x ,s) (46)
= h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze) (47)
=
1
2
log2pie
(
P+Q+ 1+ 2
√
PQ− (P+Q+ 2
√
PQ)2
P+Q+ 1+ 2√PQ+∆
)
− 1
2
log2pie
(48)
which upon simplifying yields the desired expression.
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